The PNP has the best chance of doing so. PNP supporters raise clenched fists, one of the party's symbols during a rally. Right: Labour party supporters in a jubilant mood during a party rally.

I HAVE deliberately avoided producing articles on polls that have been done by me or by other pollsters. I have indeed always taken the position that the role of the pollster is to produce the data, explain to the constituents that will be exposed to it and leave further comment to those who care to do so. But the challenges of this 2002 election have been such that some comment on what has taken place over this time is unavoidable.

CHANGES IN THE ELECTORATE

Since the early part of 1990, the electorate has shown increasing signs of maturity to the extent that there is now a greater emphasis on issues at the expense of blind party loyalty. Both sets of polls, those conducted by the Stone team and those conducted by my organisation, have shown that voting is not any longer significantly influenced and dictated by loyalty to party. The electorate is now far more aware and far more astute, far more discerning today.

POLITICS AS MARKETING

I have consistently made the point in public speeches that marketing is what should underpin all efforts to win political favours and consequently win elections.

Very little emphasis has, however, been placed by the respective parties on the simple concept of establishing what it is that will make the electorate tick and seeking to deliver this better than opponents. It could be that those involved feel that politics is a special science and need not take into consideration understanding and satisfaction of the needs of the people that are their constituents. The just concluded campaign to a large extent was played out without due reference to the establishment of a marketing plan or the pursuit of a set of progressive goals aimed at the ultimate satisfaction of winning the election.

The JLP for example appeared to have lost their way after their major triumph in the NE St. Ann by-election. Instead of sitting back and assessing their particular strengths coming out of that campaign, the victory in the NE St. Ann election seemed to have buoyed Seaga to feel that this represented a positive turning point for the JLP and that he, having won that election without the benefit of a Bruce Golding in the party, could certainly do without a Golding in future exploits at the polls.Winning that election might have been a bad thing for the JLP instead, because it somehow filled them with confidence that they now had the tools to beat the PNP in a general election.

In a way, the PNP better understood the marketing, for what the defeat in NE St. Ann did was to convince them that they had lost their connection with the people. The posting of Maxine Henry-Wilson and Dr. Paul Robertson to the trenches suggested that they understood that failing and was anxious to re-establish that connection.

IMPORTANCE OF THE TEAM CONCEPT

That the JLP managed to stay ahead of the PNP in virtually every poll conducted by us between September 2000 and January 2002 was indicative of the extent to which the PNP had become less than desirable as a party and government. Throughout 2001, the JLP led the PNP by as many as six percentage points on occasions.

We have established through both quantitative and qualitative work done by us, that because the JLP was not seen as a cohesive team, some of the benefits in party support that might otherwise have accrued to them were lost because the electorate felt that the entire JLP effort was concentrated around Seaga alone.

The PNP on the other hand were seen at the other end of the spectrum, certainly having a team, but with a leader who did not exhibit the desired level of hands-on management that was required. It was obvious to the man in the street and polls were hardly needed to point out that this was how the JLP was perceived and that this factor was negative. The NE St. Ann victory reinforced in Seaga's mind that he could go into the 2002 election without presenting a formidable team to the electorate. The party did not demonstrate that it was cohesive and united. Indeed, in several of our polls, the view was strongly held that the JLP was not ready for government because they were not united enough. This ought to have triggered the thought that it was important to present to the electorate a different, united perspective of the JLP.

Picture this scenario. The JLP could and should have been 10 percentage points clear of the PNP at this stage and basically certain to win the election had the JLP done the following.

12 months ago find an avenue to bring Golding back into the party.

Identify 15 of the known JLP faces, Shaw, Bartlett, Chuck, Henry, Charles, Samuda, Smith etc. and put them together on a "Poster" with Seaga in the MIDDLE, perhaps with a larger photo than the others. Carry this concept around wherever they go, get people thinking about this team (market the party rather than the man). This would have convinced the electorate that the JLP has a team, that the JLP has credible second tier leadership, that the JLP could be a viable alternative to the PNP.

ROLE OF THE RESPECTIVE LEADERS

Which of course brings me to the role of the party leader in the race for political office. Polls over the last two years have shown a considerable degree of dynamism on the issue of the importance of the respective leaders and how they are perceived and rated by the electorate. In general, Patterson has recorded overall better scores on this issue, because the electorate has been shown a number of options on the leadership issue, with a number of other persons within the PNP being given the opportunity to demonstrate their leadership qualities. It re-emphasises the notion of the team concept, certainly convinced people there were alternatives to Patterson. There was no commensurate positioning by the JLP and the electorate was left to conclude that there was nothing much in the cupboard beyond Seaga. This may or may not be the case, but this is what the electorate perceived to be the case and unfortunately for the JLP this is really what matters, how people receive the information. The fact that the JLP were able to maintain an unbroken lead over the PNP all throughout 2001 was indicative of the extent to which the electorate was dissatisfied with the PNP.

THE UNCOMMITTED

From as early as 1996 our organisation began plotting the views of the 16-18 year olds with regard to their participation in the electoral process. This group has been turned off the process of politics from then and neither of the two parties have really made the effort to woo these persons until late in this election campaign. The fact is that despite the posturings of both the Patriots for the PNP and the G2K for the JLP, young people 18-24 represent the lowest level of voter registration and evince the lowest levels of voter intentions. They therefore now form a significant segment of the uncommitted and disinterested among the potential electorate.

CURRENT INDICATORS

So all the polls have been done. I can't recall ever before an election when there have been so many polls. There are privately commissioned ones, independently commissioned ones, historical analyses going back to 1944, party-commissioned ones and all manner of polls. The electorate has been given a diet of polls in this election. Ironically, despite the proliferation of these polls during this election, this is the year when they have been least controversial and most alike in their outcomes, except of course for the dramatic reversal of the PNP support in the Stone team poll released on Sunday October 13. Before then the polls all suggested from about mid- year that the PNP were virtually assured of victory. Based on all the work that we have done over the two years leading up to this election, we were able to identify which seats the PNP would safely win, which the JLP would safely win and which ones remained marginal. This election will be one of the closest yet. Our October 7- 10 poll indicated that the PNP is likely to win 40 seats to the JLP 20. Note, however, that there were 25 seats that were very borderline. The large majority of these were tending towards the PNP. It is not without precedence, however, for a party to win the popular vote and lose the election. So despite the fact that the PNP has been ahead for the better part of the year on all polls, it could conceivably come down to a point where despite this advantage, that the JLP could win if it was able to take home most of the marginal/borderline seats.

In the late September poll, we projected 23 safe seats for the PNP and 12 safe seats for the JLP, with 25 therefore up for grabs. For the JLP to win, it would need to get one or two of the 23 safe PNP seats (all won by an average of 5,300 votes in the '97 election), hold their 12 safe seats (won by an average of 2,500 votes approximately) and win at least 17 of the other 25 seats. A tall order at this time, given the fact that the current national swing is just about 10 per cent. The '97 election was won by the PNP by some 17 per cent. If the JLP can win two of the safe PNP seats this could represent a national swing of the proportion that could make it a big JLP win. The polls conducted over the weekend October 11 to 13 saw a gain for the JLP with the PNP lead down from 7 per cent to 4.2 per cent. With this reduction in the PNP lead, seat count projections will have to be revised. The net effect is that the PNP is likely to win between 34 and 37 seats, with between 26 and 23 going to the JLP. One way or the other, this election is going to be very close and with the party that wins most of the borderline seats more likely to win the election.